That headline isn't joke its completely true the original United States Supreme Court case involved Santa Clara County California suing the Southern Pacific Railroad over taxes on railroad properties which led to ruling declaring that corporations were people.
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 118 U.S. 394 (1886) was a United States Supreme Court case dealing with taxation of railroad properties. The decision was instrumental in laying the foundation for modern laws regarding corporate personhood, ruling that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause granted constitutional protections to corporations as well as to natural persons. For its opinion, the Court consolidated three separate cases
In his dissent in the 1938 case of Connecticut General Life Insurance Company v. Johnson, Justice Hugo Black wrote "in 1886, this Court in the case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, decided for the first time that the word 'person' in the amendment did in some instances include corporations. [...] The history of the amendment proves that the people were told that its purpose was to protect weak and helpless human beings and were not told that it was intended to remove corporations in any fashion from the control of state governments. [...] The language of the amendment itself does not support the theory that it was passed for the benefit of corporations
118 U.S. 394
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
v.
SOUTHERN PAC. R. CO. 1
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
v.
CENTRAL PAC. R. CO.
SAME
v.
SOUTHERN PAC. R. CO.
Filed May 10, 1886
These several actions were brought-the first one in the superior court of Santa Clara county, California, the others in the superior court of Fresno county, in the same state-for the recovery of certain county and state taxes claimed to be due from the Southern Pacific Railroad Company and the Central Pacific Railroad Company under assessments made by the state board of equalization upon their respective franchises, road-ways, road-beds, rails, and rolling stock. In the action by Santa Clara county the amount claimed is $13,366.53 for the fiscal year of 1882. For that sum, with 5 per cent. penalty, interest at the rate of 2 per cent. per month from December 27, 1882, cost of advertising, and 10 per cent. for attorney's fees, judgment is asked against the Souther Pacific [118 U.S. 394, 398] Railroad Company. In the other action against the same company the amount claimed is $5,029.27 for the fiscal year of 1881, with 5 per cent. added for non-payment of taxes and costs of collection. In the action against the Central Pacific Railroad Company judgment is asked for $25,950.50 for the fiscal year of 1881, with like penalty and costs of collection. The answer in each case puts in issue all the material allegations of the complaint, and sets up various special defenses, to which reference will be made further on. With its answer the defendant, in each case, filed a petition, with a proper bond, for the removal of the action into the circuit court of the United States for the district, as one arising under the constitution and laws of the United States. The right of removal was recognized by the state court, and the action proceeded in the circuit court. Each case, the parties having filed a written stipulation waiving a jury, was tried by the court. There was a special finding of facts, upon which judgment was entered in each case for the defendant. The general question to be determined is whether the judgment can be sustained upon all or either of the grounds upon which the defendants rely.
In January 2010 the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that corporations are people in the following case:
Citizens United v. FEC, 08-205
The Court rules that the government may regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether. Specifically, in an action brought by a nonprofit corporation, the makers of a documentary critical of Hillary Clinton's presidential candidacy, challenging the constitutionality of a federal law prohibiting corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech that was an "electioneering communication" or for speech that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a candidate, a denial of a preliminary injunction for plaintiff is reversed in part where Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), is overruled, and thus provides no basis for allowing the government to limit corporate independent expenditures. Hence, the part of McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2007), that upheld the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act section 203's extension of section 441b's restrictions on independent corporate expenditures is also overruled. However, the order is affirmed in part where BCRA sections 201 and 311 were valid as applied to the ads for the documentary and to the movie itself because disclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, but they imposed no ceiling on campaign-related activities, or prevented anyone from speaking.
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